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Introduction
As we may see from the records of the famous Erfurtian collection of medieval manuscripts, the Bibliotheca Amploniana, almost every major western commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul was already to be found in Erfurt by the early fifteenth century. 1 Several new commentaries were also written, many of which still exist in manuscript form. These include commentaries by Henricus Toke of Brema 2 , Johannes Nayl of Wartburg 3 , Johannes of Zelandia 4 and the Exercitium circa libros de anima 5 , which originates from Erfurt and has been attributed to Henricus of Hildesheim. 6 Having such a remarkable resource of Aristotelian psychology, Erfurt was also one of the strongholds of the late medieval school of the via moderna.
As the alma mater of the young Martin Luther, the university has also received attention as the scholastic context of the Lutheran Reformation. Therefore, for the study of the development of Aristotelian psychology in the early sixteenth century, Erfurt provides an interesting case for the observation of the importance of school identities for the teaching of Aristotelian psychology on the threshold of the Renaissance and the Reformation. (Berlin, 1985) , 353 for two additional commentaries related to the university of Erfurt. 7 Johannes Carnificis de Lutrea, Exercitium librorum de anima (Erfurt, 1482). As archdeacon, Lutrea was made to participate in the judicial process against his former colleague Johannes Rucherat of Wesel, who was accused of heretical teaching.
In addition to his De anima commentary, printed in Erfurt posthumously in 1482 by Paulus Wider de Hornbach, a collection of sermons and a description of a Mainzer synod in 1472 have survived from his writings. Some correspondence between Lutrea and Johannes of Wesel has also survived, and has been edited by Gerhard Ritter. However, they also discussed the opinions of other schools of thought in their works. My main objective will be to show to what degree the local tradition of t h e via moderna determined the Erfurtians' positions in the the material discussing psychology as a science as well as some general issues concerning the soul. I will also compare their ideas with certain concurrent Thomist and Scotist authors dealing with the same subjects. This, I think, will enable us to see more clearly the distinctive contribution of the Erfurt via moderna to psychology in the early sixteenth century German context.
Sources
The earliest printed work for the teaching of psychology written in Erfurt was Johannes of Lutrea's Exercitium in libros Aristotelis de anima from 1482. It is not clear what period of time its contents reflect, since its author had died already in 1472 and his teaching activity could have taken place anytime between his graduation as a master of arts in 1456 and his becoming a licentiate of theology and archdeacon in 1466. Nor can a possible redaction of the commentary by a second hand be ruled out. A similar type of work was published in 1507 by Bartholomaeus of Usingen (Exercitium de anima). 11 Formally, the two exercitia are nearly identical. They both consist of 11 Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen, Exercitium de anima (Erfurt, 1507). questions which are treated according to a uniform pattern: 1. title of the question; 2. a varying number of notanda, where terminological divisions and definitions are presented; 3. answers to the questions followed by conclusions and their proofs; 4. arguments against the conclusions and their responses. In the fourth part there is a minor difference between Lutrea and Usingen: the former posits the responses directly after the individual arguments, whereas the latter gathers the arguments and responses into small groups. Both exercitia announce which passage of Aristotle's De anima the questions are related to. Lutrea does this only by short notices at the beginning of the individual questions. Usingen is more systematic: he adds the division of books and tracts in the headings, and also gives short summaries of Aristotle's text before examining individual questions. Regarding the contents of the questions, significant differences exist.
As a general notion one could say that the number of counter-arguments in Usingen's exercitium is considerably higher than in Lutrea's work. 12 explicitly mentioned by Usingen. 36 Lutrea does not refer to Lawrence's views in the corresponding passages, although he also mentions the same author in a place where Usingen does not. 37 Lutrea is also missing a question found in Lawrence ("Utrum quelibet pars quantitativa animalis sit animal"), which appears in Usingen's Exercitium. 38 This would imply that Usingen relies more heavily than Lutrea on Lawrence's Quaestiones de anima, although it was no novelty in his time and had been available in Erfurt since the early fifteenth century. 39 It is interesting to note that the question "Utrum quelibet pars His answer is that although the existence and several features of natural entities are contingent, necessary predications can be made concerning these. The truth of these predications even depends on the existence of singular entities of nature, but it is important to note that scientific knowledge does not concern the necessary truth of conclusions, but rather what the conclusions affirm of the The Scotist Jan ze Stobnicy argues that the object of this science is the composition of soul and body, although he mentions it only as the "more probable" view and that it is "commonly held among the Scotists." He introduces three arguments in favour of this position: (1) there must exist a coherence between the object of this science and natural science in general, and since natural science considers the moving body as such, the object of psychology must be the ensouled body, (2) the composition is more than any of its parts, which renders the ensouled body more suitable as the object of this science than the soul alone, and (3) the composition, and not the soul alone, is the proper subject of the vital operations. Argument (1) arises from the Scotist notion of the object of natural science, which is not shared by Aquinas or Buridan who define it as ens mobile instead of corpus mobile found in Scotus.
Therefore the nominalist and Thomist authors do not object to this particular argument in the discussion on psychology, but rather to another related one which states that the human intellectual soul cannot be the object of psychology, since it is immovable. Argument (3) is identical to the first objection in Peyligk's discussion and is also found in the discussion of the Erfurt nominalists as noted T h e compendia follow the structure of Peter of Dresden's Parvulus philosophie naturalis, which is generally very similar to the structure of Pierre d'Ailly's Tractatus de anima, since both derive much of their structure from the pseudo-Albertinian Summa naturalium. The Erfurt compendia, as well as Dresden's and d'Ailly's earlier treatises, begin with a definition of the soul and then proceed to discuss the various potencies in a fairly systematic manner. It may be noted, though, that the later writers of the compendia do not systematize their material to the extent that they would treat species, habits and acts separately from the treatment of different potencies, as did d'Ailly. Usingen discusses passions and habits, commenting briefly on the corresponding passage in Peter's Parvulus, but Trutfetter devotes longer passages to passions and habits after the treatment of various potencies, which may indicate the influence of Comp., f. K3 r-v ; Trutfetter, Summa, ff. X4 v -6 v . 54 The two questions discussed above find a far more comprehensive treatment in the exercitia of Lutrea and Usingen. One could expect that the views of the rivalling schools might also be treated in a more adequate manner than in 59 is not focused on contemporary arguments. 61 The same applies to the question of the distinction between the soul's powers, which in the argumentation against the Thomist position does not significantly differ from Usingen's Parvulus. 62 Following these preliminary questions some differences appear between the themes discussed in the various types of expositions. The Erfurt exercitia discuss the question common in the Buridanian tradition of whether the soul is present as a whole in every part of the body. 63 Usingen also has another question, apparently taken from Lawrence of Lindores's De anima, namely "Whether every quantitative part of an animal is animal". 64 Lutrea discusses the same topic in his question concerning the soul's presence in the body. Both affirm that quantitative parts fulfil the definition of an animal and therefore they are animal.
Usingen notes, though, that the term 'animal' is then taken in an absolute sense as signifying the nature rather than an individual. 65 I n h i s compendia Usingen proceeds directly from the questions concerning the soul's definition and division of the potencies to those concerning the vegetative potency. In the corresponding passage of his Summa, Trutfetter discusses several themes concerning the intellectual and sensitive souls, such as opinions on their nature and origin. He especially emphasizes the Catholic Christian view of the intellectual soul, which is described in the form of doctrinal sentences. 66 Then he also takes up both of the questions discussed by
Usingen concerning the presence of the intellectual soul in the body, and presents a rather extensive digression into the problem of individuation while discussing the latter question. 67 Only then does he return to ask the final questions concerning the distinction of the potencies. At the end of the chapter he writes a remark for the theologians who would question the importance of the study of such matters. There he refers to the traditional analogy between the human soul and the Holy Trinity, where the different potencies have been understood to stand for the different persons of the Trinity. 68 The vegetative soul is hardly discussed in the exercitia. Lutrea devotes to it only one question, which asks about the justification of the division between the three nutritive potencies. 69 Despite the more consciously Humanist style of the Wittenbergians, some similarities with Erfurtian psychology can actually be found, even concerning the themes discussed above. According to Johann Bernhardi, the subject of psychology is the soul itself. 75 Furthermore, he states that there is only one soul in a human being, and that it is rational and responsible for sensory and vegetative functions (fungentem officiis quoque sensitivae ac vegetativae animae); 76 in a similar way, the powers of the rational soul, intellect and will, are not essentially distinct, but distinguished only with respect to their functions. 77
These formulations point to an affinity with the position of the Erfurtian via moderna, although Bernhardi does not discuss in detail the distinction between different kinds of souls or the soul's powers. 
Melanchthon mentions in his

